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object, but only the form in which objects are to be cognized when given. There is, then, a *third* source, which is the secret of all?

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## ANTHROPOLOGY.\*

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kant by A. E. KROEGER.

### PART FIRST—ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC.

*Concerning the Manner in which to Recognize the Internal as well as the External of Man.*

#### BOOK FIRST.

*Concerning the Faculty of Cognition.—General Remarks Concerning our External Senses.*

§19. We can divide the sensations of our external senses into those of mechanical and those of chemical origin. To the former class belong the three higher, to the latter the two lower senses. The former are senses of perception (superficial), the latter are senses of enjoyment (intense appropriation). This is the reason why nausea, an inclination to relieve ourselves of what we have eat or drunk by the shortest way of the esophagus, that is, to vomit, has been given to man as a vital sensation of unusual degree; since so intense an appropriation might become dangerous to the animal.

But since there exists also a spiritual enjoyment, which results from the communication of thoughts, and which, when forced upon us and is not healthy for us as spiritual food, but found to be disagreeable—as, for instance, a repetition of the same witty or supposed to be witty sayings—and which may, therefore, also become unwholesome to us on account of that very sameness: we call the instinct of nature to get rid of this spiritual food, also nausea, for the sake of analogy; although it belongs to the internal sense.

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\*[Continued from Volume X., page 319].

Smelling is, as it were, a tasting in the distance, and forces others to partake, whether they will or not. Hence it is, as being opposed to freedom, less social than tasting, which allows each guest to choose according to his inclination, amongst a variety of dishes or bottles, without compelling others to partake of his choice. Dirt is called nauseating, apparently not because it is disgusting to the eye or tongue, but because it is presumptively supposed to arouse nausea. For our appropriation of external things through our sense of smelling (in the lungs) is still more intense than that which occurs through the imbibing membranes of the mouth or throat.

The more intensely our senses feel themselves *affected*—under the same degree of the influence exerted upon them—the less do they *teach* us. *Vice versa*: if they are to teach us much, they must affect us only moderately. In the strongest light we see (distinguish) nothing; and a stentorian voice *deafens* (suppresses our thinking).

The more receptive our vital sense is to impressions (tender and affected), the more unhappy are we; and the more receptive a man is to the organic sense (sensitive), and hardened against the vital sense, the more happy—I say happy, and not exactly morally better—is he; since he has the feeling of his well being more in his power. That sensitive faculty which arises from *strength* (*sensibilitas sthenica*) we may call gentle sensitiveness; but that which arises from *weakness*, from a not being able sufficiently to resist the impression of our senses in their effort to penetrate into our consciousness, we must call *painful* sensitiveness.

#### QUESTIONS.

§20. Which organic sense is the most ungrateful and also the least useful? That of smelling. It does not pay to cultivate, or perhaps even to refine it; for there are more objects of nausea—especially in populous places—than of enjoyment, which the sense can procure us, and our enjoyment through this sense can at the best be only fleeting and temporary, if it is to give us pleasure. But as a negative condition of our well-doing, to escape inhaling unwholesome air (the exhalations of stoves, or of swamps or of dead animals) or not to use mouldy materials for our food, the sense is not unimportant. The same importance be-

longs also to the second sense of enjoyment, the sense of tasting. But this sense has a peculiar preference in that it promotes sociability in its enjoyment, which the sense of smelling does not; and furthermore in that it judges in advance at the very door of the entrance of our food into the intestines, concerning the wholesomeness of that food; since tastefulness of food is pretty sure to indicate its wholesomeness, unless gluttony has spoiled taste by too much artificial refinement. The appetite of the sick generally longs for that which, like medicine, works to their benefit. The smell of food is as it were a foretaste; it invites the hungry to partake of favorite dishes, just as it repels those who are sated.

Is there a vicariousness of the senses, whereby the use of one sense can represent that of another? We can coax the deaf to accustomed speech by gestures; that is, by the use of their eyes;—provided they have ever been able to hear—or by observing the motion of their lips, and even by merely touching their moving lips in darkness. If they have been *born* deaf, however, we must change the sense of *seeing*—which we do in the former case from the movement of the organs of speech—from the sounds produced, into a *feeling* of the movement of the vocal organs themselves. But they will never thereby arrive at actual conceptions, since the signs, which they need for that purpose, cannot be made universal. The lack of a musical ear, in cases wherein the mere physical ear is uninjured, and in which cases a man is able enough to hear sounds but not tones, to speak but not to sing—is a deformity which it is difficult to explain. In the same way we have men who can see well enough, but cannot distinguish colors; and to whom all things appear, therefore, as in an engraving.

The lack or loss of which sense is most important to us—the sense of hearing or of seeing? If the first named sense were inborn it would be the least dispensable of all senses; but if it is only the result of cultivation, through the use of the eyes, as has been explained, the loss of it may be in some way replaced through sight; especially if the sufferer is wealthy. But persons who have grown deaf in old age, miss this means of communication very much; and while we see many blind people who are communicative, social and gay at the table, it is a rare thing to find a single person who has lost his hearing, otherwise than cross, suspicious, and dissatisfied in society. He sees in the

features of the company present certain expressions of feeling, or at least of interest, and endeavors in vain to discover their meaning, whereby he is really condemned to solitude in the midst of society.

§21. It is further to be observed that we class among the two latter senses (which are more subjective than objective), a sensitiveness in regard to certain objects of external sensuous perceptions, which have this peculiarity, that they are merely subjective and work upon the organs of smelling and tasting by means of a stimulation, which is nevertheless neither smell nor taste, but felt only as the effect of certain fixed salts, that prompt the organs to specific expurgations. Hence these objects are not internally appropriated by our organs, and actually enjoyed. They merely touch our organs and are soon after removed; but for that very reason they can be used the whole day long (eating and sleeping time excepted) without bringing about satiety. Their most common material is tobacco, whether it be by snuffing it, or putting it into the mouth between the cheek and the gums, in order to stimulate the secretion of saliva, or by smoking it through pipe-stems—as even the Spanish women of Lima smoke their cigars.

The Malays use for the latter purpose the areka nut, wrapped up in a betel leaf, and which has the same effect as tobacco.

This longing (*pica*) is to be regarded—apart from the medical good or harm which the clearing out of the fluid elements from both organs may effect—as a mere stimulation of sensuous feeling in general. It is, as it were, an oft repeated impulse acting on our recollection, to attend to our thoughts, which would otherwise fall asleep, or become tedious through uniformity and sameness. This means of self-entertainment on the part of man replaces society, since it fills the emptiness of time, instead of conversation, by ever newly aroused sensations and very transitory but always rejuvenated stimulations.

#### CONCERNING THE INTERNAL SENSE.

§22. The internal sense is not pure apperception, or a consciousness of what man *does*—for this belongs to the thinking faculty—but of what is felt by man, in so far as he is affected by his own play of thoughts! It is based upon man's internal contemplation, and hence upon the relation of our representations in

time—as they appear therein either simultaneously or in a successive order. The perceptions of this internal sense and the true or seeming internal experience which results from their combination is not merely *anthropological*—where we disregard the question whether man has a soul (a special incorporeal substance) or not—but *pathological*—where we believe that we perceive such a soul, and where we regard the mere faculty to think and feel as a special substance, inherent in man.

From this standpoint there is, of course, only one internal sense, since man does not feel himself internally through different organs; and one might say that the soul is the organ of the internal sense. In this case we say of it, that it is subject to illusions, which consist in this, that we either take its appearances to be external appearances (thus confounding illusions with actual sensations); or, still worse, hold them to be manifestations of another being, of which we nevertheless have no external perception, in which case the illusion turns either into visionary dreaming or into ghost seeing, both of which conditions are a cheating of the internal sense. Both cases rest on a malady of the soul: a longing to accept the play of the perceptions of the internal sense for experimental knowledge, whereas it is simply fiction; and often also a desire to plunge into an artificial mental condition—perhaps because we consider it wholesome, and elevating us over the commonness and lowness of sensuous perceptions—and thus to cheat ourselves afterward by fancies formed in accordance with that artificial condition—(to dream when wide awake). For in the course of time man comes to consider that which he has purposely planted in his mind, as something which has existed previously in his mind, and believes that he has discovered in the depths of his soul the very thoughts or fancies which are forced upon him.

This was the case with the visionary charming fancies of a BOURIGNON, or the visionary terrifying fancies of a PASCAL. This dissonance of the mind cannot very well be put to rights again by rational arguments—for what can these effect against matters believed to be actual? The tendency to become absorbed in or turned in upon one's self, together with the illusions of the internal sense arising therefrom, can be brought into order only by leading man back into the external world and thereby into the order of things, which lies before our external senses.

CONCERNING THE CAUSES OF THE DECREASE OR INCREASE OF  
OUR SENSUOUS PERCEPTIONS IN DEGREE.

§23. Our sensuous perceptions are increased in degree, 1, by contrast ; 2, by novelty ; 3, by change, and 4, by intensification.

*Contrast.*—Contrast is the putting aside of each other, under one and the same conception, sensuous representations which are averse to each other ; whereby our attention is called into play. It is thus distinguished from contradiction, which is the connecting of two opposite conceptions. A well-cultivated piece of land in a desert elevates our perception of the former by the mere contrast. The noise and splendor of a court, or be it only of a large city, when compared with the quiet, simple, and yet contented life of a farmer ; or a house with a thatched roof, but its rooms commodious and tasteful : such contrasts delight our eye ; and we love to linger over them, since they strengthen our senses.

Poverty and haughtiness, however ; or the gorgeous jewelry of a lady, whose washing is none of the cleanest ; or, as in the case of a late Polish noble, tables groaning under luxuries and served by numerous waiters, wearing wooden shoes ; such things are not in contrast but in contradiction to each other, and one sensuous perception destroys or weakens the other, because it tries to unite opposites under one and the same conception ; and this is impossible.

Still there is also a way of effecting a comic contrast, and of uttering an evident contradiction with the *tone* of truth, or placing before an audience something evidently contemptible in the language of praise, for the sole purpose of making the absurdity more deeply felt—as, for instance, FIELDING in *Jonathan Wild*, or BLUMAUER in his travestied *Æneid*—and thus for example, to make a jolly parody of a heart-breaking novel like *Clarissa*, with a view of strengthening the senses by freeing them from conflicts, wherein false and dangerous conceptions have involved them.

*Novelty.*—The new, which includes the rare and the hitherto concealed, revives attention, because it involves a further acquisition ; hence our sensuous perception increases by it in strength, whereas everyday, habitual occurrences deaden attention. This does not include, however, the discovery, inspection or public exhibition of subjects of antiquity—such as we might have supposed,

according to the natural course of things, to have long since been destroyed by the tooth of time. To sit upon a piece of the wall of an old Roman theatre (in Verona or Nismes), to have under one's hands the house-furniture of that people, discovered after so many years in Herculaneum from under the lava which had buried it, to be able to exhibit a coin of the Macedonian kings, or a gem of ancient sculpture, &c.: all this arouses the senses of a *connoisseur* to profound attention. An inclination to acquire some knowledge, merely on account of its novelty, variety, and hidden qualities, is called *curiosity*. This inclination, although it merely plays with perceptions, and has otherwise no interest in its object, deserves no censure, provided it is not extended to spying out matters which are of interest only to others. But so far as the mere sensuous impression is concerned, each morning comes to us new, and by the newness of its sensations makes all the images of our senses (unless the latter are really sickly) clearer and more vivid, than they usually are in the morning.

*Change.—Monotony*—a perfect sameness in our sensations—results at the end in their *atony* (a growing tired on the part of our attentiveness to its condition) and then our sensuous perception grows dim. Change refreshes our senses, but a sermon read off in the self-same tone, whether shrieking or moderate, puts a whole congregation to sleep. Work and rest, city and country life; in our social intercourse, conversation and play; in solitude amusement, whether by means of novels or poetry, or philosophy and mathematics: such changes strengthen the mind. It is the same vital force which stirs the consciousness of our sensations, but its various organs relieve each other in their activity. Hence it is easier to converse for some time while *walking*, since the muscles of the leg, in this case, take rest one after the other, than to remain standing stiff in one and the same place, in which case the muscles have to work without rest for a while. Hence also does it happen that traveling has so great a charm; it is a pity however, that with people of leisure it leaves a blank (*atony*) behind, as the result of the monotony of home life.

It is true that nature herself has ordered things already beforehand in such a manner, that pain enters uncalled between pleasurable sensations, such as entertain the senses, and by this entrance makes life interesting. But to allow pain purposely to intervene merely for the sake of change, and thus to hurt one's self, to have ourselves waked up merely to feel the pleasure of



renewed dropping off to sleep, or, as in Fielding's novel, "Tom Jones," where the publisher of that book added a final part to it after the author's death, to introduce, for the sake of variety, the element of jealousy after the wedding (wherewith that novel originally closed) is absurd; for to make a state of things worse than it is does not increase the interest which the senses take in it, even in a tragedy. For an ending is not variety.

*Intensification to a Climax.*—A continuous series of successive sensuous perceptions, which differ in degree, and of which the succeeding one is always more intense than the one preceding, has a maximum of intensity (*intensio*), to approach which is reviving, whereas to pass beyond it is exhausting (*remissio*). But the point which separates both conditions, is the completion (*maximum*) of the sensation, and is followed as its result, by impassivity and hence lifelessness.

If we desire to keep our sensuous faculty alive, we must not begin with strong sensations—for they make us insensitive to those that follow—but rather deprive ourselves of them at first, or take them in short measure, in order to be able to ascend always higher. The preacher begins in his introduction with a cool exposition addressed to the understanding, which points to the taking to heart of a conception of duty, and afterwards introduces into the analysis of his text a moral interest, finishing in the application with exciting all the motives of a human soul through all the sensations, which can give emphasis to that interest.

Young man! deprive thyself of the satisfaction of thy senses—gayety, luxury, love, &c.—though thou doest it not with the stoical purpose of becoming able to do without them, but with the refined Epicurean purpose of having constantly in view an ever-increasing enjoyment. This stinginess in regard to the capital of thy vital senses, makes thee truly richer through the postponement of enjoyment, even though thou shouldst have renounced the use thereof, for the greatest part, at the end of thy life. The consciousness of having the enjoyment in thy power is, like all that is ideal, more fruitful and far-reaching than all that which satisfies the senses, and which by thus being itself used up at the same time with that satisfaction, is taken off from the sum of the whole.